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UN PLIGHTED TROTHS 
CAUSES FOR DIVORCE IN A FRONTIER TOWN 
TOWARD THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
C. ROBERT HAYWOOD 
"W elcome to Dodge City, the biggest, 
wildest, wickedest little city on the continent," 
was the exuberant greeting given out-of-town 
visitors to Dodge's Fourth ofJuly celebration in 
1883. The assessment projected was a self-
congratulatory one shared and frequently en-
vied by the rest of the United States. Dodge was 
enjoying the peak of its cattle-town fame and 
prosperity as the quintessential frontier boom 
town, unrestrained by convention, the "very 
embodiment of waywardness and wantonness." 
Few communities seemed more at odds with the 
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national social values and mores that later gen-
erations would label Victorian. As a mecca for 
free-spending cowboys it was a place to let off 
steam, live high, and have fun. For the mer-
chants, gamblers, joint operators, and cattle-
men it was a time to fleece the unwary, reap 
handsome profits, and grow respectably rich.! 
But not for everyone. Mary Sawyer needed a 
divorce--desperately needed to be free of the 
marital trap she found herself in. She was con-
fined to a sick bed in a dugout where the damp, 
crumbling walls provided shelter "little better 
than living outside." Her husband swore at her, 
falsely accused her of adultery, refused to pro-
vide adequate food or fuel, and neglected her at 
the most critical point of her illness. For Mary 
Sawyer, the crucial questions relating to Dodge 
City were would the local courts in this male-
dominated setting where women were seen in 
the courtroom only in the dock or on rare occa-
sions in the spectator's gallery, provide a rem-
edy for her plight? And, if so, on what grounds?2 
For the rest of the United States, contradict-
ing the stereotypical conception of ironclad 
marriages and compliant, even beleaguered, 
Victorian wives, divorce rates rose rapidly in 
the last half of the nineteenth century, jumping 
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almost eighty percent in the United States in 
the decade of the 1870s. Mary perhaps knew 
that the West led the other sections in this 
increase and Kansas ranked well up among the 
leading states.3 Kansas supported liberal statutes 
and generous judicial interpretations of what 
constituted grounds for divorce. The earliest 
divorce law in territorial Kansas made provi-
sions for nine causes of dissolution, which in-
cluded such open, catch-all phrases as "shall 
offer such indignities to the person ... of the 
other as shall render his or her condition intol-
erable."4 The statutes applying during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century had expanded 
to ten the causes for granting a divorce. Al-
though omitting the nebulous "intolerable con-
dition" clause, the newer statutes replaced it 
with an equally flexible expression, "gross ne-
glect of duty."5 District courts could and did 
grant divorce for anyone or any combination of 
the ten reasons. Ford County, with Dodge City 
the county seat in 1874, was served by the 
Sixteenth District Court and, like more than 
three hundred other citizens of the town and its 
environs between 1874 and 1900, Mary Sawyer 
brought her petition to the District Court.6 
The rapidly rising national divorce rate was 
not initiated by the changing laws, however, but 
was, like the laws themselves, a reflection of 
society's changing understanding of the duties 
of marriage partners. Women's rights were ex-
panded during this period and women took 
advantage of changed attitudes to free them-
selves from unfortunate unions. Approximately 
seventy percent of all divorce cases in the 
United States were initiated by women (70.3 
percent in the Dodge City district). These spi-
raling numbers, according to Robert L. Griswold, 
were "an accurate barometer of rising marital 
expectations" on the part of women. Men found 
the causes women used in seeking dissolution of 
marriages equally serviceable justifications for 
ending their own untenable unions. Perhaps 
Mary Sawyer would have sought the court's 
remedy earlier if she had known that female 
petitioners were usually favorably received by 
these all-male bastions of justice. Nationally, 
women received approximately two-thirds of 
the divorces granted, 34.2 percent for husbands 
to 65.8 percent for wives. In Dodge women did 
even better, winning 69.5 percent of the cases. 7 
The new perception of family life saw mar-
riage as involving mutual love and respect in 
what was to be an economically and sexually 
compatible partnership to undergird procre-
ation and shared child-nurturing. A husband in 
such an arrangement was obligated to be a 
caring and considerate companion who pro-
vided for the physical comforts of wife and 
children; the wife's reciprocal role was to pro-
vide moral guidance for all in the family, nur-
ture the children, look after the home, and 
cheerfully submit to the husband in all reason-
able demands in other matters.s Although the 
bargain seemed tipped in the husband's favor, 
the woman's position of moral superiority over 
men made her, as one western Kansas newspa-
per put it, "the inspiration of all good works,"9 
and, consequently, the recipient of great respect 
and discreet behavior from the husband in and 
away from the home, even though public life 
clearly reflected male domination. 
The details of what this domestic relation-
ship ought to be were often hammered out, not 
in the glorifying, ethereal rhetoric of women's 
magazines and other uplifting literature, but in 
the bitter, even nasty confrontations of the 
divorce court. Godey's Lady's Book could de-
scribe the moral and spiritual infusion of the 
mother as the "light of the home," a loving, 
caring, and calming companion, but when John 
H. Cane, in the district court held in Dodge 
City, charged his wife, Sally, with being "a 
woman of temper, of a cold and cruel disposition 
... easily provoked and angered, which caused 
him to leave home to keep from bearing her 
abuse" while she was "twitting him" and "aggra-
vating him," the court might agree that her 
behavior was "outrageous," but it was not a 
deviation so far from the norms of her duty as 
to justify divorce. On the other hand, when 
John used "profane and indecent language in 
the presence of the children," beat his wife with 
a broomstick, and failed to provide decent 
housing when he had the opportunity, the 
court found he had not fulfilled his duties as a 
husband and granted Sally a divorce that pro-
vided an equitable division ofland and property 
(3770).10 It was from such distinctions, aired in 
public, that the weighing of wifely and husbandly 
duty was spelled out with full legal and societal 
sanctions behind them. The District Court in 
Dodge was to have ample opportunity ro deal 
with the distinctions. 
Divorce came to the citizens of Dodge during 
the last half of the nineteenth century like the 
common cold, respecting neither class nor fi-
nancial standing. The two leading merchants, 
Robert M. Wright and Charles Rath, and their 
wives found themselves in court, as did many 
men and women who were so poverty stricken 
they could nQt travel even short distances to 
contest the proceedings. The wives of the law-
yers, real estate men, and physicians-men pos-
sessing the best education the community could 
boast (for example, Frederick T. M. Wenie, C. 
S. Williams, and Harry E. Gryden)-had the 
same dubious honor of being divorcees as did 
Tinnie Dibrow, who signed her petition with 
an X. Most divorce cases concerned obscure 
"little people," but Dodge City's most noted or 
notorious woman, Dora Hand, lost her life in a 
much publicized accident when she came back 
to Dodge in quest of a divorce from her adulter-
ous husband. 
Of 224 petitions filed between 1874 and 
1900 that are available for review, the records 
show that 139 cases were acted upon in favor of 
the plaintiff, six for the defendant, and seven-
teen were continued or dismissed, including 
one case involving a common law marriage 
(3657). As for the rest, the record is unclear. In 
making these decisions the plaintiffs and the 
courts dealt primarily with five of the ten causes 
provided for in the state constitution. 
As listed in Article 28, Sec. 6258, the grounds 
for divorce were the following. 
"First, when either of the parties had a former 
husband or wife living at the time of the subse-
quent marriage." No cases on record. 
"Second, abandonment for one year." This 
cause was cited in 54.4 percent of cases and was 
the sole cause in thirty-six. The one-year ab-
sence requirement was a liberalization of the 
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two-year requirement provided in the original 
statutes adopted in 1855. The hardship suffered 
by a spouse and family during an extended 
absence and the improvement of transportation 
on the frontier, making travel easier and quicker, 
indicated that a change in the law was needed. 
But even more important was the alteration of 
society's domestic ideology to stress the joint 
obligation of husband and wife to a marriage. 
When the prescribed duties were broken, as 
they most surely were when a spouse deserted 
the family, divorce became a benign remedy to 
be applied as soon as reasonably possibleY If 
there was a question of return or reconciliation, 
the court did not hesitate to place limits on the 
conditions for granting the final decree, and, by 
statute, the decree would only become "abso-
lute and take effect" at the end of six months. 
As was true for the rest of the United States, 
abandonment was the ground most frequently 
cited by Dodge City plaintiffs. Between 1867 
and 1886 in the United States, 75,191 women 
and 51,485 men indicated desertion as cause for 
divorcej in Kansas the difference was much 
greater, 4974 women to 2217 menY Usually 
other instances of the breakdown in roles were 
cited, but abandonment was the one cause for 
divorce that usually was met by a sympathetic 
court and the one that most frequently stood 
alone. Obviously an absent husband or wife 
could not fulfill the acceptable Victorian role. 
Once the absence was proven, or uncontested, 
the only matters in contention were determin-
ing if the plaintiff were at fault in causing the 
desertion, the allotment of alimony, the assign-
ment of the custody of children, the restoration 
of prior names, and the division of property. 
Generally the plaintiff had only to demon-
strate that the guilty partner had not been 
present in the home for more than twelve 
months. Noah Newland went for a visit to Ohio 
and never came back (3264)j C. C. Christal, in 
failing health, came West in search of a more 
salubrious climate and could not persuade his 
wife to join him (3197)j and ]. W. Coleman 
"fled the country" to escape charges of incest 
(3723). Other cases were not so clear: at least 
two railroad men claimed they were forced by 
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their job to move frequently and could not get 
home. Emmet Sherwood's use of that defense 
was judged spurious, however, when he also 
confessed he had sent no money home for over 
a year (3813). The court granted his wife the 
divorce plus a $1000 single alimony payment 
and eventually garnished his wages to pay court 
costs. Lettie Sugg and Amanda Adams success-
fully defended themselves from the charge of 
abandoning their husbands when they demon-
strated that they had been forced to return to 
their families to escape their husbands' abuse 
(3318,2843). 
The court's sympathy was clearly with any 
woman whose husband had neglected his role as 
provider, but a wife's abandonment of her hus-
band was also considered gross neglect of duty. 
The plight of the wife and family with no 
provider, however, was many times heart-
rendingly desperate and the court took cogni-
zance of the fact. 
Women's citations of abandonment, curi-
ously in light of present-day understanding of a 
wife's right to employment and a career, were 
accompanied by a litany of complaints regard-
ing the husband's failure in his major duty as 
provider, which "forced," "compelled," or "ne-
cessitated" the wife to become gainfully em-
ployed, frequently outside the home. Sarah 
Foster spoke for a number of wives when she 
complained that after her husband left her she 
was "compelled to take in washing" (3732). But 
even if the husband did not stray, wives who 
were required to work felt abused if they were 
forced to neglect household duties. Mary Ann 
Kimmel and the court found "extream curuelty" 
in being forced to work in the family laundry 
"from 6 0' clock in the morning until 11 o'clock 
at night" to the near total neglect of her duties 
and, to add to the harm, to have her husband 
appropriate the money earned (2313). Others 
found it necessary to take in boarders, do sew-
ing, serve as nurse, or "go out to service." A 
husband's failure to provide subsistence not 
only rendered the family destitute but put the 
woman's chances of succeeding as wife and 
mother in jeopardy when she had to assume the 
husband's rightful role as well. There was no 
instance when a wife's working was by itself 
alone considered cause enough for divorce, but 
many women used a description of the hardship 
involved to prove the marriage's failure. 
"Third, adultery." The charge of adultery was 
part of the divorce proceedings in 17.5 percent 
of the cases and was the only cause cited in 
eight cases. The pattern for the rest of the 
United States during the 1867-86 period was 
not quite so clear with 38,184 husbands charg-
ing adultery while 29,502 wives made the same 
complaint. In Kansas the pattern gave a better 
than two to one edge for husbands making the 
charge.13 Just as the proof of abandonment was 
the quickest and most certain path to a success-
ful divorce for women, men found that proof of 
adultery brought the same sure and rapid deci-
sion. During Dodge's early years as a roistering 
cattle town, men more frequently used the 
charge than they did in the 1890s, and the 
husband was more readily believed, as was 
Israel La Montaine when he declared his wife 
was "practicing the nefarious business of a whore" 
(142), Thomas Cooper, who reported that his 
wife "for over one year last past [was] a common 
Harlot [in a Dodge City brothel] committing 
adultery with many persons at diverse 
times" (161), and Daniel Knox, who reported his 
wife to be a "notorious prostitute in one of the 
Dance Halls" (166). Such cases took little of the 
court's time. 
Adultery, however, was usually committed 
in less public places and, consequently, the 
charges carried greater detail as to where, when, 
and with whom (86, 113, 189, 225, 3089). 
Depositions from neighbors or the adulterer's 
partner apparently were not difficult to secure, 
and in those instances where the defendant did 
not appear before the court, the statements of 
the plaintiff alone were accepted as proof. One 
long-suffering husband presented nothing more 
than his statement that he had not seen his wife 
for "four years preceding the birth of a child," 
thus neatly tying abandonment with adultery 
(197). 
Wives did not charge adultery as often as 
men and in only one case was it the only cause 
a woman cited--even then the petitioner noted 
that because of her husband's actions he had 
given her a "loathsome disease" (968). Most 
named names, dates, and places and the most 
distressing petitions were those in which the 
episodes occurred in the plaintiffs' homes (43, 
211,968,3722). When the wife listed the cause 
as a major contention, the court rarely failed to 
grant her a divorce or to restore her maiden 
name and custody of children. 
Society considered falsely charging a wife 
with adultery particularly degrading and the 
courts deemed it the worst form of mental 
cruelty, destroying health as surely as any 
physical disease. 14 Victorian concepts of the 
"true woman" placed high value on married 
virtue, and for a man to impugn his wife's 
character fal~ely was particularly damning. A 
Texas judge stated: "Of all the treasures cher-
ished by a woman, her reputation for chastity is 
the dearest. 'It is the immediate jewel of her 
soul'; and when an attempt is made by her 
husband, who should be her protector, to rob 
her of it; cruelty has reached its utmost limit."15 
By further implication, a woman wrongly ac-
cused might be placed in harm's way since 
lustful men might be encouraged to act on the 
allegation, and, on a more prosaic level, the 
woman in question and those associated with 
her could suffer personal and financial loss 
because respectable people would shun them. 
Jobs could be lost and other economic opportu-
nities denied. All of these possibilities were 
aired in the Dodge City court. 
SuIt ina J. Averill alleged that the false accu-
sations of adultery made by her husband were 
designed to force her to leave the community so 
that he could control their lands and lumber 
yard (3375). In a cross petition Emma Alter 
claimed her husband, "a stingy and miserly" 
man, had bribed her own brother to spy on her 
and then falsely accused her of being an adul-
teress in order to defraud her of her property by 
forcing her to return to Ohio (3756). Amanda 
Adams was also able to free herself from such a 
charge by proving she had left her husband only 
temporarily to aid a sister. She had intended to 
return and was never involved with any other 
man (2843). The court awarded the divorce to 
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her along with custody of the children and the 
requirement that her husband pay court costs 
and the legal fee of $10.00 (2843). When Wil-
liam Ingram presented a counter petition reit-
erating his charges of unfaithfulness after his 
wife had condemned his false accusations, the 
court supported her description of his "insane 
jealousy" and awarded her a substantial prop-
erty settlement (3543). 
On a number of occasions the husband's false 
charges included incest, which the courts judged 
to be even more cruel. Jennie M. Zwich's ac-
count of her husband's false charge that she had 
had sexual intercourse with her father was 
deemed to constitute both physical and mental 
cruelty since both she and her father suffered 
public shame, disgrace, and physical collapse. 
Adultery and incest were charges that could 
easily backfire without ample proof and even 
then the court's reaction was uncertain. One 
judge found the provable charge of "a dissolute 
character" of a wife keeping a bawdy house in 
Wichita no cause for divorce because the hus-
band "knew the woman's character when he 
married her" (3827). A local newspaper, in one 
of its rare comments on divorce proceedings, 
praised the judge's action as an endorsement of 
"the sanctity of the marriage VOWS."16 
With that strange double standard of the 
time, newspapers rarely mentioned divorce liti-
gation except to list the case. Editor Nicholas B. 
Klaine of the Dodge City Times admitted that his 
paper avoided reporting on trials that had too 
many "racy features" because a "moral paper" 
ought not "shock the readers with details."17 
Such sensitivity, however, was not shown in 
reporting other instances of the peccadilloes 
and high life of Front Street. In Dodge City 
society appeared to condone the necessity of 
divorce but regretted the unpleasantness of 
sexually explicit discussion in public of what 
people already were gossiping about in private. 
The untarnished, morally superior wife in the 
home was the very foundation of the Victorian 
social order, and official reporting avoided be-
smirching the image. 
"Fourth, impotency." There is no instance of 
this condition being used as even a minor cause 
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by a plaintiff. In spite of the blatant display of 
advertisements in the papers for nostrums de-
signed to cure the condition, leading a reader to 
speculate that impotency had reached epidemic 
proportions, attorneys and their clients found it 
of little use as a cause for divorce. 
"Fifth, when wife, at the time of marriage, 
was pregnant by another than her husband." 
This was one of the rarely used statutory causes 
for divorce. Mattie Stein in her petition admit-
ted to being pregnant at the time of marriage 
but condemned her husband for making a false 
charge that the child was "a bastard child" 
which caused her "great mental agony and 
distress." Apparently to strengthen her case, 
she added adultery to the charge (3744). Bertha 
E. Butts provided an interesting twist in ad-
mitting she was pregnant at the time of her 
marriage. Since she was under age of lawful 
consent, her husband married her to "escape 
criminal prosecution" and had reviled her, 
calling her a "G-D-- D-D- whore," which 
caused "great mental and physical suffering" 
and a miscarriage (3524). Without a confession 
from the wife, prior pregnancy by another man 
was hard to prove and attorneys apparently 
advised using other more common grounds for 
action. 
"Sixth, extreme cruelty." Next to abandon-
ment, cruel or abusive behavior was the most 
frequent cause appearing in women's petitions. 
It was at least one of the causes cited in sixty-one 
cases and the sole cause in eight. Most descrip-
tions of a husband's cruelty were straightfor-
ward enough: the husband choked, struck, 
kicked; beat with fists, sticks, clubs, or other 
handy household articles; and threatened mur-
der, occasionally with gun in hand. With the 
changes by mid-century of society's understand-
ing of family and gender roles, duties, and 
acceptable behavior, women's charge of mental 
cruelty gained a more sympathetic hearing in 
the courts. 
The "true woman," it was believed, ought 
not be subjected to brutish behavior, excessive 
or aberrant sexual demands, indecent lan-
guage, ridicule before strangers, or other action 
that might trigger nervous disorders. Women's 
reaction to such stressful conditions were 
lumped under the medical term neurasthenia, 
which had by 1890 become "a part of the 
modern medical landscape." Although an ill-
defined ailment, associated particularly with 
middle-class women in modern, urbanized set-
tings, it was considered physically debilitating, 
and if unchecked, deadly. Nervous exhaustion 
from whatever cause was understood to have 
the power to destroy health and in effect be-
come a physical disorder. IS The courts in Dodge 
City reflected this changed understanding, and 
women as plaintiffs increasingly included men-
tal cruelty in their petitions. In describing the 
effect of such behavior, women and, on rare 
occasions, men, used such terms as "causing ... 
great mental agony" (3744), "great mental 
pain" (3732), "mental distress before friends" 
(3722), and "suffering nervous prostrations" 
(3797). Vile and abusive language was particu-
larly noted as a nerve-shattering offense. Vic-
toria Mills charged her husband with "never 
having a kind word" for her and said he often 
called her vile names such as "damned bitch" 
(3711). Edward R. Steward brought similar 
charges against his wife, who called him vile 
names, hit him with an iron rasp, and threat-
ened him with "a 40-4 revolver" (3730). Both 
men and women petitioners cited vile and pro-
fane language and name-calling as evidence of 
the breakdown of a marriage. Apparently Dodge 
City believed that the roles of both spouses 
called for civility and respect and that offensive 
language indicated that the relationship had 
been irreparably lost. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in 1883 (Carpen-
ter v. Carpenter) reversed the previous court's 
position that specific proof had to be presented 
to show alleged mental cruelty had caused 
physical suffering, and the use of the term in 
divorce petitions increased.19 Justice Daniel N. 
Valentine, the presiding judge, criticized older 
interpretations that had "taken too low and 
sensual a view of marriage relations," and he 
called for courts to move to "a higher plane, and 
to consider it [marriage] as a mental and spiri-
tual relationship, as well as physical relations." 
His response paralleled society's demand that 
men ought to be aware of women's keener 
domestic, religious, and moral position and 
treat wives accordingly. Extreme cruelty, 
whether physical or mental, had reached the 
front line attack in most women's petitions by 
1900. Men, too, apparently on the assumption 
that what is good for the goose is good for the 
gander, sometimes included the charge in their 
petitions, as did Charles L. Clemons who "suf-
fered great mental anguish ... which affected 
him mentally and physically" (3182, see also 
3422). Abandonment, adultery, drunkenness, 
and failure to perform the duties of a spouse 
were all coupled with accusations of extreme 
mental cruelty and generally were met by a 
sympathetic court. 
"Seventh, fraudulent contract." This was an-
other of the rarely used causes for granting a 
divorce. There was only one clear use of the 
seventh cause. Mattie Hoard claimed that she 
had been "induced to enter into marriage by 
reason of fraud" when her husband concealed 
from her how many children (six) he still had 
from his first marriage (3611). Helen Hubbell 
told the court that her husband had claimed 
before their marriage that he owned a business 
but he did not, and she had been forced to work 
as a servant to survive. She did not rely on this 
circumstance as a major contention in her case, 
however, but, like most others, fell back on 
"mental distress, ... gross neglect of duty; [and] 
extreme cruelty" (3710). Lavina Shortridge, 
who was barely sixteen when she married Ira, 
age forty-four, might have pled a flawed mar-
riage contract when, shortly after their wed-
ding, he brought what he claimed was his own 
illegitimate child into the house, but she also 
called on the same old reliables that Helen 
Hubbell had listed (3722). The seventh cause 
was largely ignored because of other clearer, 
more useful grounds. 
"Eighth, habitual drunkenness." Instances of 
liquor and habitual drug use were frequently 
cited by petitioners but drunkenness was rarely 
used as the only cause for the suit. The emo-
tional response stirred by the temperance move-
ment made drunkenness a statutory cause for 
divorce in Maine in 1838. In Dodge, an open-
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saloon town long after Kansas was legally dry, 
the fact that a person was at "divers times ... 
under the influence of liquor" was used in a 
successful petition for divorce as early as 1875 
(34). In most courts habitual drunkenness was 
seen as a clear threat to the wife's moral guard-
ianship, a corruption of family values, and an 
abasement of marriage roles. 20 Henrietta Collins 
reported her husband came home "on divers 
times" drunk, "misused and abused" her but she 
did not charge habitual drunkenness, using his 
drinking as only an example of his failure to 
conform to the acceptable role of husband (34). 
Others did use the term habitual to describe an 
intolerable condition. The use of drugs, par-
ticularly morphine, was cited in a number of 
cases as the reason for the dissolution of the 
marriage. In one of the most shocking cases, 
Carrie DeVoe Wright, after barely a year of 
marriage, petitioned the court for divorce on 
many grounds but included the charge that 
Robert M. Wright was "a habitual user of drugs, 
such as morphine, bromidia and chloral" (3 702). 
Since Wright was one of the foremost citizens 
of the town, the outcome of the trial must have 
been sensational, but no mention of the nature 
of the trial appeared in the newspaper, and the 
judge, in explaining his decision in favor of the 
plaintiff, alluded only to adultery and neglect of 
duty. 
"Ninth, gross neglect of duty." This rather 
nebulous and undefined phrase was cited as 
cause in fifty-seven cases. If the term on the 
surface appears to lack clear definition, society 
had worked out the general limits of the duties 
for husband and wife by 1875. Philosophically, 
the line was so clearly drawn that women were 
said to occupy a "separate sphere." Actual day-
to-day living was less separated than the ideal 
would suggest; still, the domestic model was 
clear enough that husbands and wives brought 
suit defending the accepted domestic standards. 
Because the home was considered the very 
foundation of the Victorian social order, its 
preservation was assumed to have paramount 
importance.21 Courts, even in cattle towns, took 
seriously the obligation of maintaining the in-
stitutional family, a task that recognized the 
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powerful ideological prescriptions of roles and 
duties. 
The plaintiff had to establish that he or she 
was well aware that both partners in a marriage 
held obligations that, if broken, would result in 
dissolution of marriage. The standard form of 
the plaintiffs petition began by stating the fact 
of a marriage and proof of residence within the 
court's jurisdiction, followed immediately by a 
declaration that the plaintiff had fulfilled the 
proper duties of the union, using such expres-
sions as "performed all and singular duties ... as 
a faithful, obedient and loving wife" (99) or a 
"dutiful, good and loyal husband" (87). These 
validations of the right to contest the marriage 
were in turn followed by a listing of specific 
causes for the action. A counter suit followed 
the same pattern of professing adherence to 
proper role and contradicting charges to the 
contrary. The cause or causes for divorce had to 
be of such severity that, as Arilla Steel said of 
her union, the marriage was "just the opposite of 
what law and society created it for" (3089), and 
thus must be abolished. 
The details of neglect were usually presented 
to the court in the individual's own words rather 
than some formalized phrase supplied by an 
attorney. Women were charged with neglecting 
the duties of motherhood: "a wicked and cor-
rupt woman ... unfit to have care ... of young 
children" (3089), "the child [was] running 
around the streets" unattended (87); of being 
extravagant or foolish in the use of money and 
always "after him" with "demands for large sums 
of money" (3280, 3523); of refusing to do the 
normal housewifely tasks of cooking, cleaning, 
and sewing because she was "away gadding 
around town" (3797); of persisting in "sexual 
denial ... for more than three months refused to 
have sexual intercourse" (3280); and of failing 
to provide a supportive, warm, and caring rela-
tionship by being "neglectful, cold, cross, un-
kind and cruel" (2843). Men were charged with 
being "cross, irritable, cursed and swore" (2395); 
of failing to provide the necessities of life when 
he "refused to pay any debts contracted for 
necessaries, [and] warns merchants not to [give 
me] credit" (3702); of demanding excessive 
and "beastly" sexual conduct when the wife was 
"forced to submit to intercourse 2 or 3 times a 
day" (3747); and refusing to provide protection 
when "he hired witnesses to swear against her 
and ruin her reputation" (3702). 
Gross neglect proved to be a bottomless pit of 
complaints. When combined with other causes 
a dreary picture of domestic quarrels and hatred 
emerges. Obviously, both male and female egos 
suffered in telling of their inability to achieve 
the idealized harmony the Victorian family 
model required, but by the time events had 
forced a public dissolution, battered egos long 
since had been dealt with, and individuals had 
braced themselves for unpleasant social reac-
tion. 
"Tenth, the conviction of a felony and im-
prisonment in the penitentiary therefore subse-
quent to the marriage." There are no recorded 
instances of the use of this cause in the Dodge 
City court. 
Mary Sawyer's venture into legal depths pit-
ted her against a man with considerable prop-
erty who hired the town's three leading attor-
neys to defend his interests.zz Her attorney, 
Harry Gryden, known as the champion of the 
underdog, made certain that due process was 
observed. Summonses were delivered, deposi-
tions taken, and testimony examined and cross-
examined. When Mary failed to secure what she 
considered a just alimony, the case was re-
viewed a year later. As plaintiff, she was finally 
granted a divorce, custody of her child, and a 
small, lump-sum alimony. Justice? Perhaps not 
pristine, but in light of the parochial nature of 
the court and the local resources marshalled 
against the petition, Mary Sawyer's mild victory 
appears remarkable. 
Mary might have been more willing to turn 
to the local court if she had known that her 
child's welfare would be a serious concern of the 
court, and, furthermore, that she had an excel-
lent chance of receiving custody of her child. 
Nationally, women were granted custody three 
times as often as husbands, and in Dodge City 
the chances were even greater. The judges 
generally seemed satisfied that the child's future 
was secure when placed in the custody of the 
more stable of the marriage partners, regardless 
of gender, not infrequently with child support 
included. Husbands were required in a number 
of instances to make monthly payments of fairly 
significant sums, $10 or $15 a month, usually 
with a time or amount limitation (3318). On 
rare occasions both parents were involved in 
the child's future through visitation rights and 
other arrangements (3616, 3626, 3374). Occa-
sionally, elaborate instructions were given for 
the care and education of a dependent child, as 
it was in the case of the infant son of Clara C. 
and Theodore Von Burgh. In that instance, 
guardianship was equally divided through six 
months stays with each parent until the child 
was of an age to choose one or the other parent, 
or until one parent remarried, when all rights to 
"Companionship and Guardianship" would be 
forfeited. The boy was not to be sent "to any 
school, academy, or institution of learning, 
under the Auspices of any religious denomina-
tion or where he would be so trained" (2643). 
In a few cases child custody was given to a third 
party when both parents were considered unfit 
(3525 ). 
By 1900 the status of child custody decisions 
in the district court in Ford County was consis-
tent with Michael Grossberg's summary of the 
situation in general throughout the United 
States: 
American custody law over the course of the 
nineteenth century thus had rearranged spou-
sal rights. Mothers gained new powers as 
custody and guardianship rights became part 
of the new legal domain of married women. 
Through the best-interest-of-the-child doc-
trine and its offshoots, women won the right 
to go to court, fight for, and often obtain their 
children. The attorney Charles Savage took 
note of the trend in the 1883 American Law 
Register when he postulated that in all areas 
of the law, "the irresistible movement is in 
the direction of the most perfect legal equal-
ity of the married partners, consistent with 
family unity." The caveat, however, hinted 
at boundaries of the newly constructed ma-
ternal legal sphere.23 
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As for the wife's welfare, the district court in 
Ford County made alimony, child support, and 
property settlements when warranted, although 
alimony was not requested in most cases, and, 
when granted, payments were generally limited 
to $10 or $20 a month, or to a lump sum of $200 
to $300. Considering that day laborers averaged 
around $35 per month, the amounts were sub-
stantial enough to at least provide for a child's 
well being until the mother could become es-
tablished in a job or other living arrangement. 
(The court did not always make a distinction 
between payments of alimony and payments of 
child support.) More affluent clients were fre-
quentl y required to make more substantial single 
payments (806, 3281). A case in point was 
Carrie Rath's divorce from Charles Rath, reput-
edly Dodge's wealthiest entrepreneur. Charles 
Rath initiated the suit, paid Carrie $4500 at 
the time the petition was drawn, and was di-
rected to pay $2500 more when the divorce was 
granted, as well as $35 a month child support 
until the child reached age fifteen (1064). 
When property was involved, judges usually 
provided for distribution of land, lots, and 
goods. In cases involving homesteaders who 
could show that the family's property was the 
result of joint effort, provisions were made for 
the wife and husband each to receive some 
land, livestock, and household furnishings. 
SuIt ina Averill received $240 "permanent ali-
mony" and a quarter section of land (3375), 
Carrie Philips was awarded thirty head of cattle 
and two horses (807), and Ernestina Wilson, a 
town wife, received $750 and three lots (3749). 
The financial settlements that stirred the 
greatest bitterness did not favor women to the 
same extent shown in the granting of divorces 
and custody of children. Still, wives were not 
always left destitute or on their own resources if 
there was property to be claimed. 
The protection extended to Mary Sawyer 
and other female petitioners by male judges in 
a clearly male-dominated society that prided 
itself on being freer and less regimented than 
settled Eastern communities reflects an en-
lightened and perhaps unexpectedly advanced 
perception of individual rights. The very nature 
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of local judicial proceedings, however, was a 
liberalizing influence in interpreting the state's 
bare-bones provisions for divorce. When all 
the cases in the Dodge City court are reviewed, 
the trend toward expanding the rights and 
duties of all members of a family is apparent. 
Even more remarkable, the judges assumed an 
almost unlimited patriarchal control of family 
relationships once they came under the court's 
authority.24 
Throughout the Victorian period, some 
people saw the growing authority of local courts 
as endangering family stability. "We do not 
recognize the Family at all in our National 
Constitution," lamented the Reverend Samual 
Dike, a leading advocate of uniform divorce 
codes. "Weare purely individualistic .... The 
perils of democracy in the domestic institutions 
are part of the price we pay for our political 
system."25 In the matter of Sawyer v. Sawyer and 
other contested divorces, the persistent local-
ism that resisted national codes was changing 
the conception of the family. Husbands re-
tained the greater share of assets, probably 
because in their role as family providers they 
had managed and controlled the various hold-
ings. In at least one instance the husband was 
given the option of purchasing property 
awarded the wife (3490). The male domination 
of local courts may have affected these finan-
cial decisions. Male judges seemed far more 
interested in seeing women removed from un-
fortunate, unsuccessful, and unacceptable mar-
riages than in punishing husbands through ma-
terial awards to the freed spouse. Preserving 
Victorian roles of husband and wife apparently 
weighed heavily in judicial decisions. 
As I have noted elsewhere: "The law of any 
community comes to represent just about what 
society considers convenient, proper, or profit-
able at the moment."26 For Dodge Citians, the 
liberalizing pressures of societal conscience re-
garding gender roles and responsibilities had 
brought changes and new protections to the 
individual members of a family. The piecemeal 
decisions of local courts codified grassroots ex-
pressions of values and familial duties in the 
creation of the family as a collection of distinct 
legal personalities, including women and chil-
dren, with enhanced rights as well as responsi-
bilities. What was true for the rest of the United 
States, especially in the West, was true for Mary 
Sawyer in Dodge City and reflected the unex-
pected sophistication of a region many Ameri-
cans considered scarcely civilized and certainly 
isolated from Eastern judicial niceties. 
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